



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Secret

MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK CX

25X1

Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters During 1983

25X1

A Research Paper

DIA review
completed.

NAVY, NGA Reviews
Completed

Secret

SOV 84-10133CX
August 1984

25X1

Copy 440

Page Denied

NAVY Review Completed



**Directorate of
Intelligence**

Secret

25X1

Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters During 1983

25X1

A Research Paper

NAVY Review Completed

25X1

This paper was prepared by [redacted] of the
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Theater
Forces Division, SOVA, [redacted]

25X1

25X1



Secret

SOV 84-10133CX

August 1984

25X1

25X1

Secret**NAVY Review Completed**

**Soviet Naval Activity
Outside Home Waters
During 1983**

25X1

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 15 April 1984
was used in this report.*

Statistical analysis indicates that Soviet naval ships spent a record high of over 60,000 ship-days outside home waters in 1983—6 percent more than in 1982. The time spent out of area by general purpose submarines and amphibious warfare ships increased, while that of surface combatants declined. The Soviet presence increased in every region except the Indian Ocean and the waters off West Africa. Overall, however, the average daily out-of-area presence of about 165 ships and submarines—more than half of which were auxiliaries and research ships—represents less than 10 percent of the Soviet Navy.

25X1

Several changes in deployment patterns and composition occurred:

- In the Indian Ocean, the number of Soviet ship-days continued the steady decline that began in 1981. The Soviets continued their efforts to secure naval privileges in Seychelles, Mauritius, and other littoral states. Other activities included operations by the Novorossiysk vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) aircraft carrier.
- In the Pacific, the overall Soviet presence increased almost 18 percent. This was largely due to the continued growth of the Soviet naval force in the South China Sea to a size rivaling that of the Indian Ocean Squadron.
- In the Mediterranean, the Soviet presence increased somewhat, with a moderate reinforcement of the squadron during the Lebanon crisis. The Soviets continued to develop naval ties with Libya and to seek contracts for the repair of naval auxiliaries in Greek shipyards.

25X1

- In the Atlantic, the Soviet presence increased 10 percent.
- In the Caribbean, no Soviet task group arrived in Cuba until 1984. It conducted extensive ASW training activities with Cuban naval forces.
- Off West Africa, the number of Soviet ship-days remained stable. There were a number of show-the-flag visits.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1

- Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) continued to make up a substantial part of the overall Soviet presence in 1983.

25X1

25X1

We believe that the pattern and scope of Soviet naval deployments observed in 1983 will continue in 1984. Distant deployments provide Moscow high visibility abroad but involve the commitment of only a small portion of total Soviet naval resources. Moscow is not likely to undercut the readiness of the Navy to perform high-priority wartime tasks in waters close to home by increasing the number of units operating in foreign waters. Newer and more capable platforms will, however, be deployed. We expect the Soviets will continue to respond to fluctuations in the size of the Western naval presence in distant regions and to pursue the operational and political benefits of new or expanded naval privileges in Third World nations.

25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1

iv



Secret

25X1

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Scope Note	vii
Introduction	1
General Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployments	1
Measuring Soviet Naval Presence	3
Regional Levels	3
Indian Ocean	3
Pacific Ocean/South China Sea	5
Mediterranean Sea	7
Atlantic Ocean	8
Caribbean Sea	9
West African Waters	9
Soviet Naval Air Deployments	11
Global Exercise	13
Outlook	13



25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1

Scope Note

This paper is one in a series that annually summarizes Soviet naval and naval air activity outside home waters. It includes trends in the level of Soviet naval presence in distant waters, and it seeks to highlight the more important or unusual activities of the Soviet Navy in those waters. Changes in Soviet access to or use of foreign naval and naval air facilities are also noted. This paper touches on Soviet naval diplomacy in the Third World as it relates to Soviet naval operations, but it does not include analysis of Moscow's foreign policy in the Third World. It also does not cover naval activities in waters contiguous to the USSR or the wartime missions or capabilities of the Soviet Navy.

25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1

Secret

25X1

NAVY Review Completed

Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters During 1983

25X1

Introduction

This paper examines the Soviet naval presence in seven regions during 1983.¹ The level of naval deployments is compared with that of recent years, and important naval activities in each region are highlighted. The paper also looks ahead to likely developments in 1984 and beyond.

25X1

commitment of ships to the Atlantic increased about 10 percent last year, and ship-days in the Mediterranean Sea rose nearly as much.

25X1

25X1

25X1

From Moscow's perspective, the acquisition of naval privileges associated with distant deployments serves both operational and political purposes. Operationally, the Soviets' use of foreign facilities contributes to their ability to sustain worldwide deployments in keeping with the position of a major international power. It provides an opportunity for peacetime reconnaissance of Western naval forces that could extend into the early stages of hostilities. Most foreign facilities to which the Soviets have access, however, are not currently suitable for extensive wartime logistic support or for pre-positioning supplies. They serve largely as secure, sheltered anchorages, and most would be highly vulnerable in wartime. Politically, the Soviets appear to believe that naval forces abroad can reinforce Moscow's response to regional crises, underscore its commitment to specific policies or local regimes, and support its efforts to strengthen ties to individual governments. Such benefits are intangible, however, and historically transient.²

25X1

General Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployments

The Soviet naval presence outside home waters increased 6 percent in 1983, to a record high of almost 60,000 ship-days—nearly 5 percent above the previous peak set in 1980. Although this number reflects an overall rise in out-of-area deployments, there have been increases and decreases in the number, as well as changes in the type, of ships deployed to individual regions (see figures 1 and 2). In 1983, Soviet ship-days in the Pacific increased approximately 18 percent—due mainly to the continuing growth of the naval presence in the South China Sea and the continuing decline in ship-days in the Indian Ocean since 1980—a decrease of about 14 percent last year. Soviet deployment days in the Caribbean increased 9 percent. West African ship-days, which increased about 80 percent in 1982, declined slightly in 1983. The

25X1

¹ Regional boundaries, as shown in figure 11, are determined by the Naval Operational Intelligence Center.

25X1


25X1

Secret

25X1

25X1

Figure 1
**Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
 by Region, 1975-83**




- [] Pacific Ocean
- [] Caribbean Sea
- [] Atlantic Ocean
- [] Mediterranean Sea
- [] West African waters^a
- [] Indian Ocean

^a West African ship-days for 1975 are included in
 Atlantic Ocean data for those years.

303388 8-84

Figure 2
**Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
 by Type, 1975-83**



- [] Hydrographic and space event support ships
- [] Auxiliaries
- [] Amphibious ships
- [] Mine warfare ships
- [] Surface combatants
- [] General purpose submarines
- [] SSBNs

303389 8-84

25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1

Measuring Soviet Naval Presence


Using ship-days as a measure of Soviet naval presence outside home waters can be misleading without taking several considerations into account:

- Yearly statistics for overseas deployments do not highlight the large percentage of noncombat ships that the Soviets maintain abroad. Many naval auxiliaries such as yardcraft, repair ships, and submarine tenders are deployed out of area, and they are included in the ship-day count. In 1983 nearly 43 percent of Soviet ship-days represented such auxiliary ships and craft. (Another 13 percent accounts for research vessels and SESSs.)
- Our figures do not differentiate between days at sea and those spent in ports or sheltered anchorages.
- Ships in transit for sea trials or interfleet transfer are counted, although they may perform only limited operational functions or none at all.
- The Soviet Navy must commit ships to maintenance before, after, and sometimes during overseas deployments to maintain out-of-area force levels. Thus the ship-day count does not reflect the total time involved in supporting distant naval operations.
- Soviet out-of-area deployments attract significant attention; yet, they tie up well under 10 percent of the Soviet Navy on a daily average. In 1983 the Navy deployed a daily average of 18 surface combatants and about 28 general purpose submarines—only about 6 percent of the combatant inventory and approximately 12 percent of the general purpose submarines.

Regional Levels

Indian Ocean. Soviet ship-days in the Indian Ocean continued the downward trend that began with the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis in 1981 and the subsequent reduction in the US naval presence in the region. The Soviet presence dropped by approximately 14 percent in 1983 (see figure 3). During the same year, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron consisted of an average of 24 ships—down from about 32 in 1980, 30 in 1981, and 28 in 1982. The Squadron usually included one general purpose submarine, two or three surface combatants, a mine warfare ship, one

Figure 3
Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean, 1974-83



25X1

25X1

303390 8-84

25X1

Secret

or two amphibious ships, about 14 auxiliaries, and three or four research ships or SESSs. Changes in the Squadron's composition during 1983 further diminished its operational capability:

- Surface combatant ship-days, which fell 36 percent in 1982, dropped another 17 percent in 1983 continuing the pattern begun in 1981.
- Ship-days for general purpose submarines dropped by 60 percent to a level last seen in 1976—less than a fourth of the 1980 figure. No submarines were present in the Indian Ocean for more than three months from early May to early August.
- Auxiliary ship-days decreased somewhat during 1983, while amphibious ship-days remained fairly stable.
- The only notable increase during 1983 was in mine warfare ship-days, but these ships serve as monitoring platforms and do little to enhance the combat potential of the Squadron.
- As in 1982, a Soviet carrier task group deployed into the Indian Ocean. It made port calls in Mozambique—where the official reception was luke-warm—and Madras, India. One combatant also broke off and visited Seychelles during transit. Forces deployed to the Indian Ocean participated in a worldwide Soviet naval exercise (see Global Exercise). [redacted]

25X1

Louis in 1983. Several civilian research vessels did call, however, during 1983 and the first quarter of 1984. In late March 1984, a diplomatic clearance request was submitted to the Mauritian Government for the projected May 1984 visit of two destroyers and an auxiliary oil tanker. [redacted]

In 1983 the Soviets made a record number of port calls to Seychelles. These included calls requested by President Rene—as he has done in the past—to support his regime during his absence from the country or during times of perceived danger to his government. One call, for example, was made by a Soviet Ropucha-class amphibious landing ship that stayed in harbor for several days, during which time small, tightly controlled groups of ship's crew and naval infantrymen took shore leave. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] the Soviets ashore—as in other locales—do not command the respect of the local populace because of their arrogant attitude and lack of spending money. This Ropucha is referred to by some Seychellois as “Rene's babysitter,” because it has appeared on several occasions during his absence from the country. Other calls were made by combatants and both naval and civilian research ships. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The Soviets reportedly made additional efforts to increase their access to Seychelles by attempting to gain limited access to dilapidated fuel storage facilities on Sainte Anne Island. They have failed, however, to obtain access to any naval support facilities, in spite of military aid and their longstanding offer of protection for Rene. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Ship visits by US, British, and French ships also occurred in late 1983 and early 1984. The US Navy reported that its port call was a success, and US naval personnel were welcomed by the Seychellois. [redacted]

25X1

The Soviets continued to support the Indian Ocean Squadron with auxiliary ships and yardcraft stationed at Ethiopia's Dehalak' Deset (Dahlak Island) and at Aden, South Yemen. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The Soviets made no headway in gaining further naval access to Mauritius last year. Only a naval-subordinated research ship made a port call at Port

Secret

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] little change was noted in 1983. Some minor construction [redacted] at Dahlak suggested that the contingent of Soviet technicians may have been augmented. [redacted]

25X1

25X1 Sri Lanka continued to contract for the repair of a few Soviet auxiliary ships during 1983. Singapore's shipyards remained closed to Soviet naval vessels, as they have since the invasion of Afghanistan. Auxiliaries continued, however, to make port calls to Singapore, often for replenishment, during transits between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the Soviets renewed their periodic requests for naval ship visits to Madagascar in 1983 and proposed an enhanced naval assistance program that would include patrol boats, training assistance, and a joint exercise. Thus far, President Ratsiraka has apparently resisted these Soviet overtures. [redacted]

25X1

Pacific Ocean/South China Sea. The Soviet presence in the Pacific Ocean, especially in the South China Sea, increased almost 18 percent over 1982, setting a new record for Pacific ship-days (see figure 4). The presence of every category of ship except research vessels increased—but the level of surface combatant days remained stable. [redacted]

25X1


Deployments in the South China Sea accounted for nearly 60 percent of Pacific ship-days (see figure 5), continuing the trend that began in 1982—a growth in Pacific presence in the South China Sea and the contraction of the Indian Ocean Squadron.³ [redacted]

25X1

An average of more than 40 ships and submarines were deployed out of area in the Pacific on a typical day during 1983. Of that number, about four general purpose submarines, two or three surface combatants,

³ Because of the greatly expanded Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea since 1981, US Navy ship-days data for 1983 separate the Soviet presence in that region from that of the overall Pacific Ocean for the first time. [redacted]

Figure 4
Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean, 1974-83




25X1

303391 8-84

Secret

25X1

Figure 5
**Soviet Ship-Days in the South China Sea
 Compared to the Remainder of the Pacific, 1983**



one or two mine warfare ships, one amphibious ship, 14 or 15 auxiliaries, and one research ship were normally in the South China Sea—compared with two or three surface combatants, eight auxiliaries, and three general purpose submarines in 1982. Elsewhere in the Pacific, five nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), three general purpose submarines, one surface combatant, four auxiliaries, and three research or SESS ships were generally deployed out of area.

25X1

The role of Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, as the support center for expanded Soviet naval operations in the South China Sea continues to grow. In 1983, limited expansion of berthing facilities—work on a sixth pier, the fourth to be built by the Soviets—progressed slowly. Security checkpoints were built at the approaches to these piers. A naval infantry security unit of platoon-to-company size may also be present.

In addition to the number of facilities for training and crew rest and recreation that have been built, the Soviets added an infantry-style obstacle course in 1983. This may be for the use of the naval infantry security unit.

25X1

Bunkering and repair facilities were not included in identifiable expansion of ashore support for Soviet naval forces. The Soviets remain dependent for these services upon a diverse group of auxiliary ships and yardcraft—whose numbers nearly doubled in 1983. The Soviet hospital ship Ob also makes periodic deployments to Cam Ranh—possibly to provide medical or other personnel support.

25X1

The 8,500-ton floating drydock delivered to Ho Chi Minh City in 1982 continues to service Soviet merchant and some auxiliary ships, as well as Vietnamese ships. A second 8,500-ton floating drydock arrived in Vietnam late last year from the Black Sea. It remained moored and inactive at an old logistic support depot just upriver from Ho Chi Minh City, until it was towed to Petropavlovsk in April 1984. A small transporter dock that remains at Cam Ranh may have been turned over to the Vietnamese Navy.

25X1

25X1

303392 8-84

Secret

6

25X1

Secret

25X1

Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea increased about 8 percent in 1983—to the highest level since 1976—yet remained well below that of the early-to-middle 1970s (see figure 6). In 1983 the Mediterranean Squadron normally included about 48 ships: nine surface combatants, nine general purpose submarines, a mine warfare ship, one or two amphibious warfare ships, 24 auxiliaries, and three or four research ships. [redacted]


There were several notable changes in the composition of the squadron:

- The presence of general purpose submarines rose about 23 percent, to the highest level since 1980, ending the steady decline in the Mediterranean submarine presence since that year. The submarines not only represented a heightened Soviet response to regional tensions; they also participated in regular exercises of the Mediterranean Squadron.
- The presence of amphibious ships—normally one Alligator landing ship or two small Polnocny landing ships—more than tripled from the year before. These ships usually remained at anchor in the eastern Mediterranean, probably ready to respond to an escalation of the crisis in Lebanon that might require the evacuation of Soviets. Amphibious ships also took part in some of the numerous exercises throughout the year.
- The presence of all other categories of ships in the region increased slightly or remained about the same. [redacted]

As in recent years, most Soviet naval activity occurred in the eastern Mediterranean in connection with the Lebanon crisis and the subsequent augmentation of US and West European forces in the region. In addition to monitoring Western naval and naval air forces, Soviet units made a large number of port visits to Syria, both for minor upkeep and replenishment from auxiliary ships and to show the flag in support of Damascus. [redacted]

The
Soviets also conducted a surface gunnery exercise off

Figure 6
**Soviet Ship-Days in the Mediterranean Sea,
1974-83**



Secret

25X1

25X1

Lebanon for the first time in December 1983, probably in response to US actions in the region.

25X1

25X1

Soviet naval relations with Libya reflected the caution exercised by both sides in recent years. Soviet naval port calls to Tobruk and Tripoli continued periodically, with the most frequent calls during the spring and summer. The simultaneous visit of an Oskol-class repair ship and a J-class antiship cruise missile submarine (SSG) to Tobruk in December 1982 was repeated in July and October 1983.

25X1

25X1

25X1

A joint submarine and repair ship visit took place in February 1984 as well, when a T-class SS and an Amur-class repair ship called in Tobruk. Such visits supplement the support given Mediterranean-deployed submarines in the crowded port of Tartus, Syria, and may include support of Libyan submarines as a quid pro quo. Soviet naval aircraft also deployed periodically to Libya during the year. While the Soviets certainly will continue to take advantage of limited access to Libyan naval facilities, we believe they will reject any attempt by Qadhafi to embroil them in a potential US-Libyan maritime conflict.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

Soviet access for ship repairs in the region did not change substantially in 1983. According to the Greek media and US sources, Soviet unarmed auxiliaries continued to be repaired in small numbers at the state-owned Neorion shipyard on Syros Island. According to attache reporting, an apparent attempt to have an auxiliary repaired at a Piraeus shipyard, near a major Hellenic Navy base, was turned down, most likely because of the protests of the Hellenic Navy. The Soviets are also testing to see how far they can push the Greeks on the matter of port access. Attache and press reports also indicate that one visit of two Soviet warships to Piraeus, in October 1983, included the commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

In 1983 the Soviets continued routine servicing of submarines in Syria and overhaul of submarines and subtenders in Yugoslavia and auxiliaries in Tunisia.

The press reported in early December that a Soviet-Tunisian protocol on maritime affairs had been signed. The protocol contained little substance, according to attache reporting, but did cover the establishment of some type of training assistance for Tunisian shipyard workers.

Atlantic Ocean. Soviet ship-days in the Atlantic Ocean increased about 10 percent in 1983.

All categories of ship presence increased except for surface combatants, which declined.⁴

V-III-class SSNs were initially deployed off the US east coast for reconnaissance and surveillance patrol in 1983. In early November, a V-III collided with the towed acoustic surveillance array of a US frigate several hundred miles west of Bermuda. One of the two signals intelligence collection ships (AGI) that routinely operate off the US east coast and a salvage ship deployed to Cuba responded to the disabled submarine. The disabled V-III SSN was towed to

⁴ Although the number of Soviet ship-days in the Atlantic is second only to that in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic ship-day totals do not represent the same kind of operational naval presence that is found in the Mediterranean, where an on-station squadron makes up the majority of the ship-days. Ships moving from the Northern Fleet to the Mediterranean, West Africa, and other regional deployment areas appear in Atlantic ship-day counts, as will most interfleet transfers, maiden deployments, and sea trials.

25X1


25X1

Secret

Secret

25X1

Figure 7
Soviet Ship-Days in the Atlantic Ocean,
1976-83



Cuba for emergency repair and was eventually able to return to the Soviet Union under its own power.

25X1

25X1

Caribbean Sea. No Soviet task group visited Cuba during 1983,

25X1

Soviet presence for the remainder of the year consisted of a few auxiliaries and research ships (see figure 8).

25X1

25X1

The next Soviet task group, comprised of the Moskva-class helicopter carrier Leningrad, a Udaloy-class destroyer, an F-class diesel-attack submarine, and a naval tanker, arrived in Cuba in late March 1984. The Leningrad is the first helicopter carrier sent to Cuba by the Soviets, and the task group's arrival marked the first visit to the Caribbean by an Udaloy-class ship.

25X1

25X1

West African Waters. In 1983 the Soviet naval presence in the waters of West Africa dipped by 6 percent from the 80-percent upturn in 1982 (see figure 9). The composition of the West African patrol changed only marginally from that of 1982 and consisted of an average of one surface combatant, one amphibious warfare ship, three or four auxiliaries, and one or two research ships. The general purpose submarine presence was reduced, however, to a single F-class SS deployed for about two months, in contrast to the presence of an F-class during most of 1982. An Alligator-class landing ship was deployed to the region for most of 1983, however, which more than doubled the amphibious deployment of the previous year.

25X1

25X1

25X1

303994 8-84

25X1

Figure 8
**Soviet Ship-Days in the Caribbean Sea,
 1974-83**





Figure 9
**Soviet Ship-Days Off West Africa,
 1976-83**



25X1

25X1

303395 8-84

303396 9-84

Secret

25X1

Although Soviet support for the Angolan Government increased in 1983, the level and nature of Soviet naval operations in the region did not change markedly. As in 1982, the Soviet Navy made port calls in the region to show the flag. The most visible was that of a task group visit to Luanda led by the Kiev-class carrier Novorossiysk in November 1983.

25X1

[redacted] the visit may have included an amphibious landing exercise by naval infantry and landing craft from the Ivan Rogov-class large landing ship with the task group. Unlike the two preceding years, no Soviet naval visits were made to Namibe (Mocamedes) in 1983. The Soviets cautiously stayed away during the increased hostilities in the region.

25X1


The destroyer stationed at Luanda subsequently made a port call to Ghana—the first visit to that nation since late 1981. In 1983 Ghana also began to allow some Soviet access for air transports. Relations with Ghana may become increasingly important for Moscow if access to Guinea is curtailed or denied [redacted]

Soviet Naval Air Deployments

Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) aircraft to distant areas continues to provide Moscow a valuable asset for reconnaissance of Western naval forces. Increasingly, however, SNA is becoming more important as an operational tool in reaction to regional events and as a potential asset in the event of hostilities.

The level of SNA presence abroad in 1983, as measured in aircraft days in country, dropped less than 1 percent from that in 1982 (see figure 10). This trend

Figure 10
**Overseas Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation,
1976-83**



303397 8-84

Secret

25X1

25X1

Secret

25X1

does not reflect, however, the many significant changes in the pattern and types of deployments that occurred. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The most important SNA development in 1983 was the deployment of nine TU-16 Badger aircraft to Cam Ranh Bay in November. The force, apparently a composite squadron, consists of five strike, two tanker, one photoreconnaissance, and one electronic countermeasures (ECM) aircraft. Other than the presence of Badger bombers in Egypt in the early 1970s—which were eventually turned over to the Egyptians—the only previous out-of-area use of Badgers occurred in a single exercise-related reconnaissance deployment of short duration to Syria in 1981. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] both missiles and missile support equipment for the AS-2 and AS-5 antiship air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) are present at Cam Ranh Bay. In addition, the amount of support equipment and the extent and pace of construction at the airfield suggest that up to a regiment of naval Badgers, some 30 to 35 aircraft, could eventually be deployed there. For example:

25X1

- The number of ground support vehicles at Cam Ranh jumped from less than 20 to roughly 100 in late 1983. [redacted]
- A number of new barracks and storage buildings have been completed or are under construction.
- Petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage capacity has been increased by millions of liters and could be further expanded.

25X1
25X1**Secret**

12

25X1

Secret

25X1

25X1

The Soviets continue periodically to deploy a pair of Bear Ds to Cuba. Since March 1983, however, a pair of Bear Fs has accompanied these aircraft. Although the Bear Fs and Ds do not yet fly in mixed teams as they do out of Cam Ranh Bay, two Bear Fs and one Bear D did fly a mission together in October 1983. The Bear F ASW aircraft operate mainly between the United States and Bermuda, where they may attempt to locate US SSBNs transiting to and from their bases. The Bear Ds fly [redacted] often against US naval battle groups—in a wide area off the East Coast. [redacted]

25X1

Outlook

We expect the evolution observed in the type of Soviet deployments to foreign waters during 1983 to continue in 1984 and beyond:

- The presence of general purpose submarines operating out of area will continue a gradual upward trend. [redacted]

25X1

In addition, modernization of the Soviet general purpose submarine force will continue to make more and better submarines available for out-of-area operations.

25X1

- While the number of surface combatant ship-days logged in distant waters may continue to decline or stabilize near current levels, we expect the Soviets to deploy newer and more capable surface ships out of area.

25X1

- The presence of amphibious warfare ships in foreign waters will probably continue to increase as the Soviets become increasingly aware of their utility for regime support and contingency response to crises abroad.

- Because Moscow's quest for naval access abroad continues to meet with mixed results, the presence of large numbers of auxiliary ships will continue to be essential to support the Soviet Navy's out-of-area operations. As in the past, the Soviets are unlikely to allow their desire for naval and/or naval air privileges to jeopardize their political relations with potential host states. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

The overall level of distant Soviet naval deployments will probably remain relatively stable. Regional naval presence, however, will fluctuate because of crises and/or the augmentation of deployed Western naval forces. The Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean should stabilize at a lower level—barring a new regional crisis—as the presence in the South China Sea stabilizes at a higher level. [redacted]

25X1

Secret

25X1


The Soviets will continue to pursue opportunities for deployment of naval aircraft—especially in West Africa and the Indian Ocean—while working to maintain their present access in the Mediterranean. Further upgrading of SNA use of Vietnamese facilities is also likely.

25X1

Secret

25X1

Figure 11
Deployment Areas of Soviet Naval Forces Outside Home Waters




Secret

25X1

Secret

25X1

Figure 12
Overs seas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces



7036032 8-84

17

Secret

25X1

Secret

25X1

Secret